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| been thought possible and the
co-ordination between different UCK units was evident,
particularly when required to mount a rapid response to
block the road that leads west out of the Drenica region
to Klina, as, in the space of two hours, a series of
obstacles had been placed on the road and defensive
positions dug. Indeed, an individual associated with the UCK has asserted that its hierarchy and structure has been a preoccupation since its inception. Thus, the region for UCK activity was divided at an early stage into 5 zones, being: Zone 1- Dukagjin; Zone 2 - Drenica; Zone 3 - Pashtriku; Zone 4 - Llapi (near Pristina); Zone 5 - Moravia. According to this individual, the Supreme Command of the entire province was composed of seven people. Each zone has an operative command with around five commanders, although this number may vary from zone to zone. A UCK member has also claimed that the structure per region was defined strictly, with only one "Shtabi Suprem", and units break down into brigades, "compounds", and "togs" (apparently equivalent to platoons). The commanders head the brigades and together with their counterparts from other regions they discuss the strategies to be adopted. As will become apparent in the chronology of events laid out below, before the Serbian/FRY offensive at the end of July 1998, the UCK controlled significant parts of the central regions of Kosovo, from the Drenica area south to Malisevo. Although the area west of the road between Djakovica and Pec was never completely under UCK control due to the strong presence of the Yugoslav Army and police forces, it nonetheless remained strong in this region, capable of relatively free movement and access to Albania. Subsequently, the UCK lost much of its gained territory, although it continued in its military operations, using its local networks and infrastructure. Initially, the UCK had no representation amongst the plethora of political actors in Kosovo. Indeed, the leader of the biggest Kosovar political party, Ibrahim Rugova, refused to even acknowledge its existence. This position did, however, change as the conflict in Kosovo ensued and Adem Demaci, the popular leader of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo, met with its representatives in February 1998, and subsequently became its political spokesman. Nonetheless, it was never altogether clear who was the real "voice" of the UCK and a variety of figures claiming some position of leadership on the political level have emerged. 17 It would seem that the UCK was not and is not a singular, unified body, with one simple hierarchy. Instead, it appears more likely that it is formed by an interlinked system of regional centres, organised around a small, core group of individuals, who have largely been living abroad. As the conflict has progressed, various commanders have emerged, many with previous experience in the former Yugoslav People’s Army, and new recruits have received rapid training in the field. Despite these regional divisions, however, each of the groups has been fighting with a common goal and with a certain level of overarching strategy. The demonstrated level of co-ordination and structure, it is submitted, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of being an organised armed group, or groups, for the purposes of the existence of an armed conflict. There can be no debate on the satisfaction of the second requirement of an armed conflict, that of "protracted armed violence", in the Kosovo context. Numerous press reports,
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