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| nature of their formations and
variety of their dress appears, indeed, to be designed to
obscure and confuse. Nonetheless, it is the assessment of
the team that these forces were present during many of
the operations described in the following sections of the
report and, in particular, they appear to have maintained
a strong presence in the western regions of Kosovo. Key
to an understanding of the role of these forces is that
"paramilitaries", as such, were not involved in
the conflict, for every "soldier" operating in
Kosovo was nominally incorporated into a formation of
security forces within the responsibility of the Serbian
authorities. Thus, unlike during the conflicts in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia, no private armies were
permitted. However, there is no doubt that many of the
paramilitary groups which took part in the aforementioned
conflicts, were, in fact, also involved in Kosovo and
provided the substance of the JSO. Additionally, there
appears to have been some overlapping between members of
the SAJ and members of the JSO. Thus, witnesses to many
of the operations by Serbian/FRY forces in Kosovo recount
the presence of soldiers with "painted faces"
and others with distinctive, large knives, or with shaven
heads, or red scarves. This indicates different groups of
"soldiers", with their own internal structure
and hierarchy, brought in under the auspices of the JSO.
It would further appear likely that these groups were
involved in those operations which resulted in the more
notorious atrocities of the conflict and, moreover, that
the choice of a particular group for a specific operation
would have been sufficient to indicate the level of
destruction and/or loss of life that was required by
those directing the campaign, without them having to give
explicit orders. The one individual whose name arises
many times as being a, or the, commander of the JSO in
the Kosovo conflict is Franki Simatovic, whose men were
designated "Frenki’s"22. While it is not possible to further elaborate on the structure of the JSO, without more sophisticated, technical methods of information gathering, it is clear that they came under the overall authority of the then Chief of State security, Jovica Stanisic, who was also the National Security Adviser to President Milosevic of the FRY23. Indeed, it appears that, for a certain period of time, Stanisic was himself present in Kosovo, to maintain control over the diverse groupings within the JSO and ensure their co-ordination and co-operation with the other Serbian/FRY forces involved. These MUP and State security forces themselves possessed considerable weaponry and equipment, but it is also the case that the Yugoslav Army ("VJ") was present in the interior of Kosovo, contrary to its constitutional role to protect the borders, and provided much in the way of support to the MUP, as well as conducting its own operations, particularly in the border regions. The VJ is a federal institution, born out of the previous Yugoslav National Army ("JNA") of the SFRY and now subject to the ultimate authority of the Supreme Defence Council, headed by the President of the FRY. At the time relevant to the present report, the VJ was comprised of 3 Armies and a Special Forces Corps, all under the formal command of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, Colonel General Momcilo Perisic. The territory of Kosovo comes within the area of responsibility of the 3rd Army, based in Nis, which was, in turn, under the command of Colonel General Dusan Samardzic. Within the
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