60

 
know of the offence committed by his subordinate47; and, third, the superior must have failed to take all measures reasonably within his power to prevent the commission of the offence, or to punish the perpetrator thereof.

While civilian as well as military leaders may be held responsible under Article 7(3), the link of command and control between such leaders and the perpetrators of the crimes must be clearly demonstrated. As eloquently stated by Trial Chamber II in its Judgement in the Delalic et al. case,

"While the Trial Chamber must at all times be alive to the realities of any given situation and be prepared to pierce such veils of formalism that may shield those individuals carrying the greatest responsibility for heinous acts, great care must be taken lest an injustice be committed in holding individuals responsible for the acts of others in situations where the link of control is absent or too remote."

Thus, once again, the Prosecutor must request further information and material from national governments, as well as gain access to the relevant documentary evidence from the FRY, in order to conclusively demonstrate the extent of command, control and co-ordination of the forces on the ground in Kosovo.

It is, nonetheless, possible at this stage to posit the responsibility of General Lukic, on the basis of Article 7(3), for he was in overall command of the MUP forces at the relevant time and bore the duty of ensuring that all MUP operations were conducted in accordance with the laws of armed conflict. Additionally, on the side of the VJ forces, General Pavkovic was in command of the Pristina Corps and thus formally controlled all VJ formations in Kosovo. He therefore bore the duty of ensuring that his troops respected the provisions of international humanitarian law. At this level, there can be no doubt that these two commanders knew or had reason to know of the unlawful actions of their subordinates. Indeed, it is here submitted that superior responsibility under Article 7(3) can also be imputed to President Milosevic, as well as the heads of the public and state security departments of the Serbian Ministry of Interior. Once again, these individuals closely controlled the operations of all forces on the ground in Kosovo and were in positions to prevent or punish the violations of international humanitarian law which they unquestionably knew were being committed. As previously mentioned, Stanisic and Djordevic were themselves present in Kosovo, ensuring the success of the campaign, along with President Milosevic’s representative, Nikola Sainovic, a deputy prime minister of the FRY.


  1. In the view of the Trial Chamber,
    "a superior may possess the mens rea required to incur criminal liability where (1) he had actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that his subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes referred to under Article 2 to 5 of the Statute, or (2) where he had in his possession information of a nature, at a minimum, to put him on notice of the risk of such offences by indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his subordinates."